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Abstract
Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal eﬀect
of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we
use ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address
the potential endogeneity of institutions. We ﬁnd that the budget referendum and lower costs
to launch a voter initiative are eﬀective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we
ﬁnd no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a
larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget
referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower
signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.
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Recent decades have seen a surge of research on the economic eﬀects of institutions. A large
body of literature has emerged that demonstrates how constitutional rules like the electoral
system or the form of government fundamentally shape policy choices.
In democracies, a particularly important institutional choice is between representative and
direct forms of government. Past centuries witnessed the gradual replacement of direct democ-
racy, where all political decisions were made by its citizens, by more representative forms of
government. More recently however, direct democracy has experienced a remarkable renais-
sance both in practice and the political debate. The number of ballot initiatives, which allow
citizens to propose new laws, has surged in the United States over the past decades, the most
famous case being Proposition 13 in California. The introduction of referendums, where cit-
izens have to approve policies chosen by the government, has in turn been on the agenda of
such diverse political bodies as the European Union and several republics in the former Soviet
Union.
The rising public and political interest in direct democracy is fueled in part by the belief that
direct voter control could slow down or even reverse the rapid growth in government spending
observed in many countries over the past decades. To evaluate the merit of these beliefs and
policy proposals favoring direct participation however requires ﬁrst a thorough understanding
of the link between direct democracy and ﬁscal policy choices. In this paper, we examine
how direct democracy aﬀects ﬁscal policy within a representative democracy. In particular, we
analyze and compare empirically the eﬀect the two most popular direct democratic institutions,
the referendum and the voter initiative, on government spending.
Theoretically, the basic tradeoﬀ in a representative democracy is between the preferences of
voters (principal) and the incentives of their elected representatives (agent). A widely held belief
2is that career concerns by politicians, asymmetric information or imperfect electoral competition
encourage politicians to pursue larger governments than desired by the median voter. In this
scenario, theory suggests two channels why direct democracy will bring actual policies closer
in line with the preferences of the median voter. The ﬁrst channel is that referendums (Romer
and Rosenthal 1979) or initiatives (Gerber, 1996; Moser 2000) can be used as a threat point by
voters to impose spending discipline on elected representatives. The impact of the referendum or
initiative on government spending is thereby independent of whether the initiative or referendum
is actually used in practice or not.
A second argument is that referendums or initiatives allow citizens to select their preferred
choice for speciﬁc policies. In contrast, parliamentary or presidential elections require citizens
to elect a candidate, each of them representing a whole bundle of policy proposals. Conse-
quently, the choices of the legislature on any single issue might be very diﬀerent from the actual
preferences of the median voter (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Besley and Coate, 2002).
In contrast to the ﬁrst mechanism, the eﬀectiveness here depends on the actual usage of the
institutions. Both channels imply that access to direct democratic institutions should decrease
the size of government if voters are more ﬁscally conservative than politicians (e.g. Peltzman,
1992).
While a number of studies have analyzed the relationship between direct democracy and
ﬁscal policy empirically,1 it is diﬃcult to interpret the existing results as causal eﬀects of di-
rect democracy on government policy (see Pettersson-Lidbom and Tyrefors, 2007). Like other
political institutions that are written into a country’s constitution, direct democracy is very
persistent over time. Though some studies use panel data, their estimates are predominantly
identiﬁed by cross-sectional variation and hence, cannot include ﬁxed eﬀects. However, if there
1Bails and Tieslau (2000), Besley and Case (2003), Farnham (1989), Matsusaka (1995; 2000; 2004) and Zax
(1989) for the United States; Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Funk and Gathmann (2008) and Pommerehne (1978)
for Switzerland.
3are unobserved state-speciﬁc factors that are correlated with both spending and direct democ-
racy, these estimates will suﬀer from omitted variable bias. Another issue is that institutions
might be themselves determined by past ﬁscal policy choices. For example, it is reasonable to
assume that citizens would demand stricter control over government budgets after a long period
of overspending.
To identify the causal eﬀect of direct democracy on government, we hand-collected a new
dataset on all Swiss cantons between 1890 and 2000. We gathered the provisions for direct
democratic control by carefully going through each canton’s past and present constitutions and
all relevant state laws. We combined this institutional information with detailed data on public
ﬁnances and socio-demographic characteristics for all cantons since the late 19th century. A
unique advantage of our long time period is that we observe substantial variation in the direct
democratic institutions over time. We can therefore estimate ﬁxed eﬀect models to control for
all permanent diﬀerences across cantons.
We address the potential endogeneity of the direct democratic institutions using instrumen-
tal variables. In Switzerland, changes in direct democratic institutions always require a revision
of the constitution. Hence, a candidate for an instrument is how diﬃcult it is to change the
canton constitution. We provide several historical examples to illustrate that the constitutional
initiative, which allow citizen to request a revision of the constitution, has frequently been
used to implement changes in direct democratic institutions since the nineteenth century. We
also present anecdotal and more formal evidence suggesting that the constitutional initiative is
plausibly exogenous from the spending regression. Consequently, we use the provisions of the
constitutional initiative in each canton since the late 19th century to identify the causal eﬀect
of direct democracy on government spending.
Given its long direct democratic tradition, Switzerland provides a unique setting for our
4analysis. The cantons diﬀer widely in their provisions for direct democratic participation.
These institutional diﬀerences allow us to separate the eﬀects of the referendum to those of
the voter initiative. Budget referendums require that investment projects have to be approved
by the voters if their costs exceed a certain threshold. The voter initiative allows the voters
to propose entirely new laws. Since all cantons in Switzerland allow for the voter initiative
over most of our sample period, we exploit diﬀerences in the signatures required to launch an
initiative.
While budget referendums have a direct inﬂuence on spending policies, citizens have little
leverage about the type of projects voted upon.2 In contrast to the referendum, citizens can use
the voter initiative to directly set the agenda how to restrict the government. However, getting
an initiative on the ballot requires additional eﬀort of preparing an initiative and collecting
the necessary signatures. Voter initiatives thus impose overall higher cost on citizens than a
referendum mandated by law. Hence, it is a-priori an open question which of the two institutions
is eﬀective in constraining the size of government.
Our results provide strong evidence that it is important to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity. While the eﬀects of the budget referendum and voter initiative we identify are negative,
they are much smaller than those typically reported in the previous literature. Our ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates show that the mandatory budget referendum is associated with 3.4 percent lower
expenditures at the state level. Increasing the signature requirement, measured in percent of
the eligible population, by one standard deviation raises canton expenditures by 2.4 percent.3
These estimates are quite robust to adding more controls or using diﬀerent speciﬁcations. For
2The budget referendum we analyze here is most closely related to budget or project-based referendums of
local school districts in the United States. An institution related to a referendum on tax increases are legal tax
and expenditure limitations, commonly found in the United States (see Bohn and Inman, 1996; Poterba, 1994;
Rueben, 1997; Von Hagen, 1991).
3For example, Feld and Matsusaka (2003) report the equivalent of 20 percent lower expenditures for the
budget referendum in Swiss cantons. The results on the voter initiative are close to the 4 percent reported in
Matsusaka (1995) for the United States.
5example, we show that shifts in the demand for government over our 110 years period do not
aﬀect our basic results. We also ﬁnd that our results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of
our direct democracy variables and changes in voting rights or the electoral system.
Next to analyzing the eﬀect of direct democratic institutions on canton spending, we in-
vestigate whether the budget referendum and voter initiative decentralize spending to lower
levels of government. In contrast to previous studies (Feld et al, 2008; Matsusaka, 1995), we
demonstrate that the budget referendum does neither increase local spending nor decentralize
spending once we account for permanent diﬀerences across states.
However, we ﬁnd that high spending periods are one motivation to adopt stricter budget
controls. To account for this institutional endogeneity, we use the provisions for changing
the canton constitution as an instrument. The instrumental variable estimates show that the
budget referendum decreases state governments by 13 to 19 percent while there is again no
eﬀect on local spending. In addition, a one standard deviation lower signature requirement for
the initiative decreases canton spending between 6 and 9 percent, but has no eﬀect on local
governments.
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we are able to control for
unobserved heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of direct democratic institutions. The
approach used in this paper is close in spirit to Poterba (1996) and Besley and Case (2000;
2003) who emphasize the importance of identifying the causal eﬀects of political institutions.4
Second, we use changes in constitutional rules as instruments to identify the causal eﬀect
of direct democracy on the size of government. Our analysis hence contributes to a small, but
growing literature that addresses the endogeneity of political institutions at the sub-national
4Petterson-Lidbom and Tyrefors (2007) also focus on identiﬁcation by using a regression-discontinuity design.
However, their analysis is not about direct democratic institutions in a representative democracy. Rather,
they compare Swedish communities between 1930-1950, that were either entirely run by town meetings or by
representative forms of government. Their results indicate that direct democratic communities spent 10-13
percent less.
6level using an instrumental variable approach (Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Knight, 2000; Rueben,
1997).5 The advantage of our historical data is that we have enough time variation in the
institutions to account for both unobserved heterogeneity across cantons and the potential
endogeneity of institutions. In contrast, previous studies could not implement an instrumental
variable approach within a ﬁxed eﬀects framework.
Since we separate the eﬀect of the initiative from those of referendums, our ﬁndings also
‘unbundle’ the causal eﬀect of speciﬁc institutional rules (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;
Feld and Matsusaka, 2003). Separating the causal eﬀects of direct democratic institutions is
important for both theory-building and public policy. It is only if we know which particular
institutional rule actually aﬀects policy outcomes that policy recommendations can be made.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide background information
on direct democracy in Swiss cantons. We describe our new historical data set in section 3.
The ﬁxed eﬀect estimates and various robustness tests are reported in section 4. In section 5,
we use instrumental variables to identify the causal eﬀect of the referendum and initiative on
the size of government. Section 6 concludes.
2 Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy in Switzerland
Switzerland has a strong federalism where cantons bear all political responsibilities unless they
were granted to the federal government in a national referendum. In 1998, 34 percent of all
government spending was undertaken by cantons, 39 percent by the federal and 27 percent by
local governments. Cantons have a lot of autonomy both in the provision of public goods and
services as well as the redistribution of wealth. The distribution of revenues across government
5There is however a large literature using instrumental variables for institutions in a cross-country setting.
See for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Hall and Jones (1999); Persson and Tabellini (2003;
2004).
7levels is equally decentralized. The tax burden (mean=100) varied from 58.2 in Zug to 126.7
in Neuchatel in 2000.
Direct democracy has always played a dominant role in Swiss politics (see Curti, 1900;
Trechsel and Serd¨ ult, 1999; Vatter 2002). At the federal level, the referendum and voter
initiative (Begehren) to demand a total revision of the constitution have been in place since
the Confederation was founded in 1848 (K¨ olz, 1992). In cantons like Appenzell, Glarus or
Uri, direct voter participation goes back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the
electorate decided on all political aﬀairs in town meetings. By 1850, the voter initiative to
propose new laws was in place in Glarus, Vaud and Nidwalden.
The two most popular -and most ﬁscal policy relevant- direct democratic institutions in the
25 Swiss cantons and elsewhere are the budget referendum and the voter initiative.6 The budget
referendum allows citizens to approve or decline individual projects proposed by the canton
government involving large one-time or recurring expenditures. While budget referendums
can be about expenditures, public sector bonds, taxes, enterprise holdings and real estate, we
restrict attention to referendums on public expenditures, which are by far the most common.
Today, most cantons have some form of budget referendum in place. In 2000, ﬁfteen cantons
had a mandatory budget referendum, which requires citizens to vote on a project that exceeds
a certain threshold.7 Ten cantons allow only for an optional budget referendum where citizens
need to collect between 100 and 10,000 signatures to vote on a project above the threshold.
The canton of Vaud does not provide for any type of budget referendum.
Between 1980 and 1999 alone, citizens in the 25 cantons voted on 461 budget referendums
and approved 86 percent of the projects (Trechsel and Serd¨ ult, 1999). Control over the budget
6The canton Jura was founded in 1978 and is excluded from our analysis.
7Thresholds for non-recurring expenditures range between 25 Million Swiss Francs (SFr) in Lucerne and
250,000 SFr in Schwyz (1999). This implies that a project of on average 6.8 million SFr or just less than 1
percent of average expenditures mandates a referendum. For recurring expenditures, thresholds range between
50,000 (Appenzell-Innerrhode, Basle County, Nidwalden, Ticino and Uri) and 400,000 SFr (Berne).
8is stronger in cantons with mandatory budget referendum, since voter approval is mandated
by law. If voters are ﬁscally more conservative than politicians, we expect that a mandatory
budget referendum decreases government spending.8
The second direct democratic institution is the voter initiative, which allows citizens to
propose entirely new laws. Their success rates range from 0 percent in Schwyz or Fribourg
to 50 percent in Vaud or Basle City. Today, the voter initiative is available in all cantons.
In most cases, the voter initiative was adopted several decades prior to the beginning of our
sample period in 1890. There is however substantial variation in the number of signatures for
getting an initiative on the ballot: in 2000, the numbers ranged from 1 in Glarus and Appenzell-
Innerrhode to 12,000 in Vaud. Voters can more easily inﬂuence political decisions when costs
to launch an initiative are low. If voters are more ﬁscally conservative than politicians, higher
signature requirements imply that voter control is more costly, which in turn might increase
government spending.
The two institutions diﬀer in how much leverage citizens have over the budget and the
costs for the voter. Under the budget referendum, citizens are restricted to approve or dismiss
individual spending projects. With the voter initiative, citizens have also other means to
inﬂuence the budget, e.g. by proposing expenditure limitations. However, this ﬂexibility comes
at a cost: launching an initiative is more costly to the voter than a referendum mandated by
law. Hence, it is an open empirical question which instrument is more eﬀective in constraining
the size of government.
Table 1 provides an overview of the direct democratic institutions in each canton in 2000.
Column (1) shows the canton that have a mandatory budget referendum in place and column
8Several cantons allow for both a mandatory and optional budget referendum: Zurich, Lucerne, Uri, Ob-
walden, Nidwalden, Fribourg, Solothurn, Schaﬀhouse, Appenzell-Innerrhode, St. Gallen, Grisons, and Thurgau.
A comparison between cantons with mandatory and optional budget referendum to cantons with an optional or
no budget referendum will therefore provide a lower bound of the full eﬀect of a mandatory budget referendum
relative to no referendum (see Feld and Matsusaka, 2003).
9(3) lists the total number of signatures required to launch a voter initiative. Reading across
columns shows that the two direct democratic institutions are positively correlated. Cantons
with a mandatory budget referendum are also more likely to have a lower signature requirement
(correlation coeﬃcient: -0.18).
Overall, direct democracy is stronger in the German-speaking parts, which include both the
large urban centers of Basle, Zurich or Berne but also the interior of Switzerland. Figure 1
shows the geographic location and strength of direct democratic institutions in Swiss cantons.
Direct democratic traditions are weaker in the dominantly French- and Italian-speaking cantons
located in the southern and western parts of the country.
While deep political institutions (like direct democracy) are typically very persistent over
time, columns (2) and (4) in table 1 show substantial variation in the provisions for the budget
referendum and the signature requirement between 1890 and 2000. Speciﬁcally, twelve cantons
adopt the mandatory budget referendum over our 110 years period while nine cantons abolish
the mandatory budget referendum in favor of an optional one. We also observe nineteen in-
creases in the signature requirement for the voter initiative and four decreases. In addition, six
cantons adopt the voter initiative over our sample period.9 Before analyzing the eﬀect of these
changes on policy choices, we describe our data sources.
3 Data Description
We collected a rich new dataset on political institutions, ﬁscal policy and socio-economic char-
acteristics for all twenty-ﬁve cantons in Switzerland between 1890 and 2000. Most importantly,
our analysis requires comprehensive measures of direct democratic institutions in each state
and year. We extracted this information from the past and current constitutions as well as
9Geneva in 1891, Ticino in 1892, Berne in 1893, Lucerne in 1906, Valais in 1907 and Fribourg in 1921.
10the relevant state laws in each canton between 1890 and today. We used several published
sources to validate and cross-check our coding of the institutional variables (K¨ olz, 2004; Mon-
nier, 1996; Ritzmann-Blickernstorfer, 1996; Trechsel and Serd¨ ult, 1999; Vatter, 2002). If in
doubt, we contacted the respective cantonal Public Record Oﬃces (Staatsarchive) to clarify
any inconsistencies.
The main institutional variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to one if a canton has
a mandatory budget referendum and zero if the canton has only an optional budget referendum
or no budget referendum in place. Our second institutional variable characterizes the provisions
for the voter initiative.
Since the voter initiative is available in all cantons for most of our sample period, we use
the number of signatures required to get an initiative on the ballot.10 We measure this variable
as percentage of the eligible voters, which assumes that the collection of 1,000 signatures is
more costly in a canton with only 5,000 citizens than in a canton with 100,000 citizens.11 Since
the number of eligible voters changes over time, we have a lot of variation in our measure of
the voter initiative in addition to the observed changes in the absolute number of signatures
required.
We complement this information with detailed public ﬁnance statistics and a rich set of
demographic controls. These variables were collected by digitizing printed information from
the ‘Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland’, the ‘Historical Statistics of Switzerland’ and the
decennial Census. The data appendix provides a detailed description of the data sources and
the construction of variables between 1890 and today.
10For the cantons adopting the voter initiative after 1890, we assigned an arguably arbitrary signature re-
quirement for the years prior to adoption. Luckily, estimates remain unchanged whether we choose 20, 30, 50 or
100 percent as the signature requirement for non-adopters. The results reported in the paper use the 30 percent
signature requirement.
11Alternatively, one could assume a ﬁxed cost of collecting signatures. In that case, the absolute number of
signatures for the voter initiative is the relevant statistic. We report those results in the robustness section.
11Table 2 shows summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis.12 The table
shows the mean and standard deviation separately for cantons with and without a mandatory
budget referendum. The last column reports the t-statistic for the mean comparison across the
two groups.
Our main outcome variables are annual per capita expenditures and revenues in each canton
as well as total per capita expenditures at the local level. All expenditure and revenues variables
are deﬂated to 2000 Swiss Francs. We also construct a centralization measure calculated as
the percentage of local plus canton expenditures that is spent at the canton level. In the raw
data, log canton expenditures and revenues are not statistically diﬀerent between cantons with
and without a mandatory budget referendum. However, cantons with a mandatory budget
referendum have signiﬁcantly higher local spending and less centralized expenditures.
Cantons with stronger direct democracy diﬀer from other cantons also in their demographic,
political and economic structure. They have a lower signature requirement for the voter initia-
tive and a smaller executive. In addition, they are more likely to have a mandatory referendum
for laws in place and less likely to elect their parliaments using proportional representation.
Further, cantons with a mandatory budget referendum are more likely to be located in the
German-speaking part of Switzerland, have a diﬀerent age structure and a larger share of rural
population.
One control variable that is not available in our data set is canton income (or wages). Both
are only available since the 1960s. We use several variables to control for diﬀerences in wealth in
our empirical analysis. Speciﬁcally, we use the labor force participation rate, the percentage of
the population owning a car, the number of doctors per capita and the infant mortality rate to
control for income diﬀerences. These four variables alone account for 47 percent of the variation
12Table A1 in the appendix decomposes the variation of each variable into a within canton and between canton
component. Most importantly for our ﬁxed eﬀects approach, the table shows that there is a lot of within canton
variation in government spending, a canton’s political institutions and socio-demographic characteristics.
12in canton income since 1965, which is astonishing given that declines in infant mortality rates
typically occurred much earlier in the century. Once we include our other control variables, for
example the size of the agricultural and industrial sector, the age structure of the population
and the share of the urban population as well as canton and year ﬁxed eﬀects, we can account
for 93 percent of the variation in canton income. Hence, we believe that the absence of a precise
measure of canton income is not a major limitation of our study. We now turn to our main
results.
4 Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Fixed Eﬀects
4.1 Canton Expenditures and Revenues
Our descriptive evidence showed that cantons with stronger direct democratic institutions are
very diﬀerent in their observable characteristics. We might therefore expect that they also
diﬀer along other, unobservable dimensions. Surely, demographics and hence the demand for
government goods and services are likely to change over the 110 years period. However, our
detailed study of the historical and current constitutions also revealed institutional diﬀerences
that are largely ﬁxed over time. For instance, citizens can recall the executive or directly elect
the president of the executive in some cantons but not in others. We would expect that both
features constrain politicians in their policy choices. Omitting these factors would therefore
bias our results upward if cantons with stronger direct democracy also permit other forms of
citizen control over the government.13
A unique feature of our long panel is that we can control for all permanent diﬀerences across
13Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity seems also important since evidence suggests that ﬁscal policy
and political institutions vary substantially between German- and French-/ Italian-speaking cantons even after
controlling for a large number of canton characteristics.
13cantons by ﬁxed eﬀects. In particular, we estimate the following empirical model,
logYct = α + βReferendumct + γInitiativect + λ
0Xct + tt + θc + εct (1)
where the subscript c denotes the canton and t the year. LogYct is expenditures or revenues
measured in logs and Xct denotes other control variables. Our year and canton ﬁxed eﬀects
are represented by tt and θc respectively. εct is assumed to be an iid error term reﬂecting
for example, measurement error in expenditures or revenues. The main parameters of interest
are β and γ, which capture the eﬀect of the budget referendum and signature requirement on
expenditures respectively. Based on our discussion above, we expect that β < 0 and γ > 0.
Table 3 shows the basic results of a regression where the dependent variable is the log of
annual per capita expenditures.14 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation with our two direct democratic insti-
tutions and year dummies shows a strong negative correlation (-0.267) between the mandatory
budget referendum and government spending. A higher signature requirement for the voter
initiative is negatively correlated with canton expenditures.
The second column adds our set of variables to control for observable diﬀerences across
cantons. The coeﬃcient on the budget referendum drops to 9.3 percent while the coeﬃcient on
the voter initiative ﬂips sign. In this speciﬁcation, an increase in the signature requirement by
one standard deviation (or 4.7 percent) is associated with 1.9 percent higher spending.
Our preferred speciﬁcation, which controls for all permanent unobservable diﬀerences with
canton ﬁxed eﬀects, is shown in column (3). The coeﬃcients are now identiﬁed from cantons
adopting or abolishing a mandatory budget referendum and canton changes in the signature re-
14There are several reasons why we choose the log speciﬁcation: ﬁrst, cantonal expenditures are log normally
distributed. Also, spending 1,000 Swiss Francs weighs more if the overall budget is smaller. Finally, the log
speciﬁcation allows a simple interpretation of the coeﬃcient on the institutional variable. Results using the level
of spending were similar and available upon request.
14quirement for the voter initiative.15 The ﬁxed eﬀects are statistically highly signiﬁcant (see last
row of table 3) and have a substantial impact on the coeﬃcients of the budget referendum and
voter initiative. The eﬀect of the budget referendum declines to -3.4 percent which corresponds
to a reduction of more than 60 percent relative to column (2). In contrast, the eﬀect of the
voter initiative actually becomes somewhat stronger with canton ﬁxed eﬀects. If the signature
requirement for the voter initiative were raised by one standard deviation, expenditures would
be 2.4 percent higher.
Even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity however, the mandatory budget refer-
endum decreases government spending. We also ﬁnd that making voter initiatives more costly
for the electorate induces more spending by politicians. Both results are consistent with the
view that voters are ﬁscally more conservative than politicians.
Do we see a similar picture on the revenue side? The estimates on the right-hand side
of table 3 show that, once we control for permanent diﬀerences across cantons (column (6)),
we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in revenues between cantons with and without
mandatory budget referendum. This result suggests that cantons with less direct democracy
ﬁnance their public expenditures in part by running deﬁcits. However, higher costs to launch a
voter initiative still result in more revenues and the eﬀect is stronger than on the expenditure
side. An increase in the signature requirement by one standard deviation is associated with 2.8
percent more revenues.
The other control variables have largely the expected sign both for expenditures and rev-
enues. For instance, cantons with lower infant mortality rate and a higher percentage of car
ownership have higher spending as do cantons with more subsidies from the federal level. These
15The changes in the coeﬃcient with canton ﬁxed eﬀects could also be driven by diﬀerences in spending
patterns between cantons that adopt or abolish the budget referendum and cantons with no changes. However,
we ﬁnd no evidence for that: for example, mean log expenditures for non-switchers are 7.19 while they are 7.16
for switchers.
15results are consistent with the fact that the demand for public services increases with income.
It is also interesting to note that several control variables ﬂip sign once we include canton ﬁxed
eﬀects. For example, the coeﬃcients on population and the size of the industrial sector are
negative without ﬁxed eﬀects but positive for the within estimator.
4.2 Substitution across Levels of Government?
The direct control of voters at the canton level might also aﬀect lower levels of governments.
Smaller governments at the canton level might decrease local spending either because citizens
prefer less government in general or because local revenues are constrained by canton resources.
There could however be the opposite eﬀect. Canton politicians that face voter control might
simply try to delegate spending to the local level. In that case, canton and local spending
would be substitutes. The previous literature has found evidence that direct democracy decrease
canton spending but increases local spending (for example, Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach,
2008; Matsusaka, 1995). Our raw data (see table 2) also suggests that cantons with mandatory
budget referendum might rely more on local governments to provide public goods and services.
To test more formally whether institutional constraints increase or decrease spending at
lower levels of government, table 4 studies how direct democratic institutions at the canton
level aﬀect spending at the local level. The dependent variable is now the log of local spending
in a canton per capita.
We ﬁrst only include year eﬀects (column (1)) and observable canton characteristics (column
(2)). Based on both cross-sectional and temporal variation, we ﬁnd that a mandatory budget
referendum appears to increase spending at the local level by 20.3 percent. In contrast, weaker
provisions for the voter initiative (a higher signature requirement) are associated with both
more local and canton spending.
16The shift to more local government might however be spurious if there are other permanent
institutional or taste diﬀerences between cantons. To account for these permanent diﬀerences,
the third speciﬁcation again adds canton ﬁxed eﬀects. The canton ﬁxed eﬀects are highly
statistically signiﬁcant (see last row) and have a striking eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the direct
democratic institutions: cantons that adopt or abolish the mandatory budget referendum do
not rely more on local spending than other cantons without that institution.
Though cantons with stricter budget referendum have higher average local expenditures,
this is entirely driven by permanent diﬀerences across cantons, not by the institution of the
budget referendum per se. Higher costs for the voter initiative however continue to have a
signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on local spending. An increase in the signature requirement at the
canton level by one standard deviation results in 8 percent higher local spending.
In contrast to previous studies, our ﬁxed eﬀects estimates indicate that stronger direct
democratic institutions lower spending at the canton but do not increase spending at the local
level. One interpretation of this result is that direct democracy does not substitute the public
provision of goods and services to the local level.
The observed changes in canton and local spending might or might not imply a more decen-
tralized structure of government. To test whether direct democracy indeed results in a more
decentralized government, we use our centralization measure as the dependent variable. Specif-
ically, the measure is calculated as
CantonExp
Canton+LocalExp. If stronger direct democratic institutions
decentralize spending, we should ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for the budget referendum and a
positive coeﬃcient for the voter initiative.
The results for our centralization measure are shown on the right-hand side of table 4.
Without controlling for permanent diﬀerences across cantons, we ﬁnd results that a mandatory
budget referendum indeed reduces centralization of government spending. Once we rely on
17within-canton variation using ﬁxed eﬀects, this result however disappears. Column (6) shows
no statistically signiﬁcant association between the mandatory budget referendum and the degree
of government centralization.
For the voter initiative, we consistently ﬁnd that higher costs of launching an initiative
reduce government centralization (column (5) and (6) in table 4). For both institutions of
direct democracy, we ﬁnd no evidence that they shift spending to lower levels of government.
These results highlight that it is important to control for permanent diﬀerences across cantons
in order to identify the eﬀect of political institutions on ﬁscal policy.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Our estimation approach might not capture all unobservable diﬀerences across cantons. Most
importantly, we would expect that the demand for government has shifted over our 110 years
period, for example, because of migration or changes in voting rights. To address this con-
cern, we construct several measures for voter preferences, which we then add to our baseline
regression.
Our ﬁrst measure uses the voter support for more government as a proxy for the demand
for government. To construct this variable, we use the fact that Switzerland allows for direct
democratic participation at the federal level.16 Between 1890 and 2000, citizens of all cantons
voted on 452 federal ballots. To assess the ﬁscal relevance of each proposition, we used the
oﬃcial documents prepared by the government, which are distributed to each citizen before the
vote.
After careful study, we identiﬁed 108 propositions where the documents showed an unam-
16For example, citizens can initiate a partial or total revision of the federal constitution, vote on changes to
the federal constitution or international treaties or request a referendum for all federal laws if 50,000 signatures
are collected.
18biguous increase in expenditures, subsidies or taxes. Table A2 provides a list of the title of all
votes with predictable ﬁscal consequences as well as the ﬁnal outcome. The table shows that
our ﬁscal policy relevant ballots span a broad range of political issues from the introduction of
fuel taxes, government ﬁnances and environmental protection to education and health policy.
For each vote, we use the approval rate in each canton for more government spending. To adjust
for diﬀerences in approval rates across votes, we calculated the measure as the deviation from
the overall mean for that proposition. Negative numbers for our preference measure thus imply
that a canton was less supportive of higher spending than the average canton in that ballot.17
As an alternative measure for voters’ demand for government, we use the strength of left-
wing parties in canton parliaments. Left-wing parties are often associated with more redistri-
bution and a larger government (for example, Tavares, 2004). Since representatives are elected
by voters, we expect that party aﬃliation reﬂects voter preferences. The variable is calculated
from the number of seats of left-wing parties divided by the total number of parliamentary
seats in a canton. The advantage of this measure is that is available for many more years. Its
disadvantage is that there might be many reasons why voters elect left-wing parties unrelated
to government spending.
The data show that cantons with stronger direct democratic institutions are much less
supportive of federal government spending. In contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence that left-wing
parties are necessarily weaker in cantons with stronger direct democracy. For both measures,
there is substantial variation over time within the same canton. Since voter preferences are
correlated with the budget referendum and also ﬂuctuate over time, they might be an important
source of omitted variable bias.
17We also experimented with alternative measures for approval rates. Our ﬁrst alternative measure uses the
percentage voting yes on a proposal instead of the deviation from the mean. Alternatively, we used a more
conservative strategy where we included votes only if we could identify an increase in expenditures (rather than
including also increases in taxes or subsidies). In both cases, the results were almost identical to the ones
reported here.
19The ﬁrst two columns of table 5 show the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator where we also include our
measures of government demand. The top panel shows the results for canton expenditures and
the bottom panel for local expenditures. All regressions include canton and year ﬁxed eﬀects as
well as the same controls as before. Including controls for the demand for government has little
eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the direct democratic institutions. Canton expenditures continue to
be signiﬁcantly lower in cantons with a mandatory budget referendum, while local expenditures
are lower or not aﬀected. The coeﬃcient on the voter initiative in turn has only a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect if we include left-wing parties possibly because of fewer observations for the
ballot measure.
We also expect that direct democracy might play a more important role for cantons with
heterogeneous populations. In column (3), we therefore add measures of linguistic and religious
heterogeneity calculated as one minus the Herﬁndahl index of concentration. Again, these
additional controls for the demand for government have little eﬀect on the coeﬃcients.
Over our period, there were also important changes in voting rights. In particular, women
were enfranchised and most cantons also switched to proportional representation during the
twentieth century. We would expect that these electoral reforms shift the median voter and
hence the demand for government. Column (4) shows that adding these two variables has little
eﬀect on our estimates.
We also check whether changes in other political institutions that are potentially correlated
with direct democratic institutions and spending could drive our results. Some cantons also
have a mandatory a law referendum, which requires every law to be approved by the electorate.
Column (5) therefore adds a binary indicator equal to one if a canton has a mandatory law
referendum in place and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcients on the budget referendum become
slightly more negative for canton and local expenditures while the coeﬃcients on the voter
20initiative remain unchanged.
Similarly, we might suspect that more political decision-makers could increase expenditures
independently of direct democracy. Column (6), which adds the size of the executive and the
number of parliamentary seats to the speciﬁcation, however shows that the eﬀects of the budget
referendum and voter initiative remain largely unchanged.
Finally, if spending is serially correlated, the standard errors of our ﬁxed eﬀects estimator
would be too small. Given the small number of policy changes in our data, we address this
concern by implementing the before-after estimator suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). We
ﬁrst ran a regression of log expenditures on all our control variables and ﬁxed eﬀects. For the
sample of cantons that changed their direct democratic institutions, we then aggregated the
residual before and after the policy change. The coeﬃcients in column (7) report the diﬀerence
in this residual. While the estimates at the local level are not aﬀected, the results at the canton
level are somewhat weaker and only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
We also checked that alternative speciﬁcations of the direct democratic variables do not
aﬀect our results (see table A3). Column (1) shows that the absolute number of signatures for
the voter initiative, which assumes a ﬁxed cost of collecting signatures, has a somewhat weaker
eﬀect on spending than if the signature requirement is measured in percentage of the eligible
population.18 Column (2) relaxes the linear relationship between signature requirement and
spending. We added variables equal to one if a canton’s signature requirement is less than 1
percent, between 1 and 3 percent and above 3 percent respectively, and zero otherwise. The
omitted category is cantons without a voter initiative in a given year. There are two noteworthy
results: ﬁrst, having a voter initiative in place substantially reduces spending at the canton and
local level relative to a canton without the initiative. Second, higher signature requirements
18If we use the log of the number of signatures instead (not reported), we again ﬁnd a strong positive eﬀect.
These estimates suggest that spending is more sensitive to changes at low levels of signatures requirements.
21(above 3 percent) reduce spending less than low signature requirements (below 1 percent). The
diﬀerence are substantial and statistically signiﬁcant, which is surprising given that signature
requirements in Swiss cantons are on average much lower than, for example, in the United
States.
There might also be important interaction eﬀects between the budget referendum and voter
initiative as argued by Feld and Matsusaka (2003). Column (3) conﬁrms that the interaction
eﬀect between the two is negative also for our much longer sample period. The estimate implies
that citizen control over the government through the mandatory budget referendum plays a
more important role when the barriers to launch a voter initiative are high. Since our sample
period spans more than a century, the relationship between direct democratic institutions and
spending could have changed over time. For instance, voters might not always have been ﬁscally
more conservative than politicians. In fact, we do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in voter support for government spending using our ballot measure between cantons with and
without mandatory budget referendum prior to 1945 (not reported). Column (4) allows the
coeﬃcients on the budget referendum and voter initiative to vary before and after the end of the
second World War. We ﬁnd that the spending reduction of the budget referendum is a recent
phenomenon. Before 1945, there is no eﬀect while after 1945, there is a statistically signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect of 4.8 percent. Similarly, we ﬁnd that that a higher signature requirement
increases spending only after 1945, while the eﬀect is actually negative between 1890 and 1945.
These estimates are consistent with evidence from the United States in the twentieth century
(Matsusaka, 1995; Matsusaka, 2000).19 Overall, this sections shows that the paper’s main
ﬁndings are robust across these alternative speciﬁcations.
19Interestingly however, voters in cantons with a low signature requirement (below the median) are ﬁscally
more conservative than voters in cantons with high signature requirements throughout our sample period (1890-
2000).
225 Instrumental Variable Approach
5.1 Policy Endogeneity
Our results thus far show that the budget referendum and voter initiative constrain government
spending even controlling for all permanent diﬀerences and other heterogeneity across cantons.
A natural concern with our empirical strategy is that institutional changes in direct democracy
are potentially endogenous and hence correlated with the residual in equation (1).
One way to assess the relevance of this concern is to analyze whether spending shifts prior
to changes in direct democracy. To test for spending shifts, dummy variables denoting intervals
four to six and one to three years prior to the institutional changes, and zero to four and more
than ﬁve years after the institutional change were added to the speciﬁcation in equation (1).
The results shown in table A4 reveal strong spending trends prior to changes in the mandatory
budget referendum and the signature requirement for the voter initiative.
It is not too surprising that spending shifts occur prior to changes in direct democratic
institutions. We would expect citizens to demand a mandatory budget referendum or lower
barriers to the voter initiative after periods of severe overspending in the eye of the voter. Table
A5 provides some support for this argument. The top panel shows that the decision to adopt
the mandatory budget referendum is positively correlated with expenditures two years prior to
the change (column (2)). Similarly, a higher growth rate in spending increases the probability
of adopting a mandatory budget referendum several years later (bottom panel). We ﬁnd in
contrast no evidence that past spending levels or growth rates aﬀect the decision to abolish the
budget referendum or change the signature requirement. Taken together, the evidence suggests
that policy endogeneity is a concern.
235.2 Constitutional Initiative and Direct Democracy
To eliminate the potential endogeneity bias, we require an instrument that drives changes direct
democratic institutions in a canton. In Switzerland, the provisions that allow citizens to initiate
new laws or vote on existing laws are regulated by the canton constitution. Hence, a candidate
for an instrument is how costly it is to revise or amend the constitution. We use the provisions
for the constitutional initiative which allows citizens to demand a revision or amend the existing
constitution as our instrument.20
There are several reasons why the constitutional initiative might facilitate changes in the
budget referendum and the voter initiative. The threat of a constitutional revision is a powerful
tool for the political opposition or other groups not represented in the government to expand
their political inﬂuence. This threat seems to be especially important when politicians are not
adequately responding to voters’ demand or changes therein.
Swiss constitutional history provides many examples where constitutional initiatives were
used to expand democratic participation rights (see Curti, 1900; K¨ olz, 1992, 2004). In 1848, the
new constitution of the Swiss federation not only adopted the constitutional initiative; it also
required all cantons to allow for the constitutional initiative in the canton constitutions. This
new institution became a powerful weapon of the “Democratic Movement”, which advocated
redistributive policies to oﬀset rising economic inequalities in the population. Its ﬁrst political
success occurred in Basle County in 1863 when the law referendum and voter initiative were
adopted; many more followed in other parts of Switzerland.
Likewise, the evolution of direct democracy since the late 19th century was strongly in-
ﬂuenced by the provisions for the constitutional initiative (e.g. K¨ olz, 2004). In Grisons, for
instance, the political opposition of young Democrats launched a constitutional initiative to
20The instrument is in the spirit of Poterba (1996) who advocates the use of constitutional rules to identify
the causal eﬀect of political institutions.
24strengthen direct democratic institutions. The initiative, which initially had trouble collecting
enough signatures, proposed to lower the barriers for the voter initiative from 5,000 to 3,000.
The revised constitution was approved by the electorate in 1891 (Metz, 1991). Similarly, a
constitutional initiative in Schaﬀhouse in 1894 demanded the introduction of the mandatory
budget referendum. The draft of the new constitution, which allowed a mandatory budget
referendum for projects with extraordinary expenditures of 150,000 or recurrent expenditures
of 15,000, was approved by the electorate in 1895 (Schneider, 1993).21
While all cantons allow for the constitutional initiative to amend or revise the constitution,
they diﬀer in the number of signatures required to launch such an initiative. Since the costs of a
revision are increasing in the number of signatures, high signature requirements should reduce
eﬀorts to reform rules governing direct democratic participation in the constitution. Conse-
quently, our instrument is measured as the signature requirement for changing the constitution
in percentage of the eligible population. On average, 3.4 percent of the eligible population is
required to get a constitutional initiative on the ballot.
Changes in direct democratic institutions are, indeed, correlated with the barriers for the
constitutional initiative. In the raw data, a reduction in the signature requirement for the
constitutional initiative by one percent increases the probability of adopting the budget refer-
endum by 1.7 percent. Hence, a one standard deviation in the constitutional initiative (2.4)
would decrease the adoption probability for the budget referendum by 5 percent.22
These simple averages, of course, do not take into account possible correlations between the
constitutional initiative and other factors that might inﬂuence changes in the budget referendum
21Other examples of the role of the constitutional initiative for the voter initiative and mandatory budget
referendum after 1890 can be found in Lucerne, Sankt Gallen, Schwyz, Uri, Valais and Zug (M¨ ockli, 1987; K¨ olz,
2004).
22Alternatively, one can study the cantons where the expansion of direct democracy was not driven by
constitutional initiatives. All four cantons (Aargau, Berne, Fribourg and Vaud) in which the expansion of
direct democracy was actually proposed by the government have very high signature requirements for the
constitutional initiative (for example, Berne with 15,000 signatures or Fribourg with 6,000 signatures in 1900).
25or the voter initiative. To allow for such considerations, we include a number of other controls
that are possibly correlated with direct democracy and the constitutional initiative.
The constitutional initiative will aﬀect both the costs of changing the budget referendum as
well as the costs of launching a voter initiative. To separate the eﬀect of the two institutions, we
exploit the long time horizon of our data. As an additional instrument, we use the provisions
for the mandatory budget referendum two decades earlier. Since institutions are persistent
over time, we expect past arrangements for the mandatory budget referendum to aﬀect the
current institutional arrangement. Indeed, the raw correlation between the mandatory budget
referendum today and twenty years earlier is 0.6.
The results of the ﬁrst stage regressions are shown on the left-hand side of table 6. The
dependent variable is whether the canton has a budget referendum in column (1) and the
signature requirement of the voter initiative in column (2). The ﬁrst stage shows that a higher
signature requirement for the constitutional initiative is associated with a higher barrier for
the voter initiative and a reduction in the likelihood of a mandatory budget referendum. Not
surprisingly, a budget referendum two decades earlier is positively correlated with the current
provisions for the budget referendum.
How strong are these eﬀects? If we raised the costs of launching a constitutional initiative
by one standard deviation or 2.42 percent, the probability of adopting a mandatory budget
referendum would be 18 percent lower. Also, the signature requirement for the voter initiative
would be 1.84 percent higher. The statistics at the bottom of the table show that we have enough
independent variation in the instruments. Shea’s partial R2 is 0.09 for the voter initiative and
0.11 for the budget referendum. In addition, the F-statistics of the instruments do suggest that
our instruments are not weak (see Stock and Yogo, 2005).
265.3 Instrumental Variable Results
The ﬁrst stage shows a strong correlation between changes in direct democratic institutions
and the barriers to launch a constitutional initiative. In order for the signature requirement
of the constitutional initiative to serve as an instrument, it must be validly excluded from the
spending equation.
This restriction is invalid if the constitutional initiative can be used to directly inﬂuence
spending or revenue decisions. A closer look at the canton constitutions however shows that
this is not the case. The constitutional initiative cannot be used to set spending levels or
spending growth rates other than the spending thresholds for the optional or mandatory budget
referendum.
The exclusion is also invalid if there are other variables that are both correlated with spend-
ing and the costs of a constitutional initiative. In particular, other political institutions ﬁxed in
the canton constitution might fall into that category, such as the number of political decision-
makers or changes in voting rights. While all time-invariant eﬀects are absorbed in the canton
ﬁxed eﬀects, changes in these institutions might still aﬀect current expenditures. Therefore, we
include as additional controls whether the canton has a law referendum, the size of the executive
and the number of seats in a canton’s parliament. In addition, we control for the adoption of
women’s suﬀrage and of proportional representation over the course of the twentieth century.
Having included these institutional changes, canton characteristics and canton ﬁxed eﬀects, the
barriers for a constitutional initiative appear to be plausible instruments.
The second-stage results are shown on the right-hand side of table 6. We ﬁrst report the least
squares results for canton (column (3)) and local expenditures (column (6)) as a benchmark.
For the budget referendum, we expect that least squares are smaller than instrumental variable
estimates because reverse causality would bias the coeﬃcients to zero. The instrumental variable
27estimates with three instruments are shown in columns (4) and (7). Our second set of estimates
(columns (5) and (8)) also includes interaction eﬀect between the signature requirements and
year dummies. Hence, the constitutional initiative might be used to adopt a mandatory budget
referendum in one period but abolish it at a later time (or vice versa).
For canton expenditures, we ﬁnd that the mandatory budget referendum reduces canton
spending by 13 to 19 percent. A one percent higher signature requirement for the voter initia-
tive increases spending by 1.3 to 1.9 percent.23 As expected, the instrumental variable estimates
are larger in magnitude than the least squares estimates. Are the instrumental variable esti-
mates also plausible given that they are two to three times larger than the OLS results? There
are at least three reasons why we consider our results reasonable. First, it is not uncommon
in the literature on endogenous institutions that instrumental variables are several times larger
than least squares (for example, Levitt, 1997; Levitt, 2002). Second, our estimates for the ef-
fects of direct democratic institutions are smaller than those found in comparable studies (Feld
and Matsusaka (2003) report an equivalent of 20 percent lower expenditures for the budget
referendum. Finally, one might suspect that large instrumental variable estimates indicate that
the instruments should be included as controls in the second stage. However, the overidenti-
ﬁcation test reported at the bottom of table shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments can be excluded from the second stage.
For local expenditures, we ﬁnd a negative or no eﬀect of the budget referendum. For the
basic set of instruments however, we do not pass the overidentiﬁcation test (p=0.03). For the
voter initiative, we ﬁnd no eﬀect on local spending irrespectively of which set of instruments we
use. Hence, the instrumental variable estimates for local spending conﬁrm our earlier results
23The F-statistics of the extended set of instruments suggest that the interaction eﬀects are relatively weak
instruments. While there is no general solution to this problem, the literature suggests the more robust Fuller’s
estimators for this case (Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner, 2004). The results for the k=4 estimator (not
reported) show that the eﬀect of the budget referendum is closer to 20 percent as suggested by the basic
instrumental variable estimates in column (4).
28that direct democracy at the canton level does not shift spending to lower levels of government.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents strong evidence that the voter initiative and budget referendum reduce the
size of government. Controlling for all permanent unobserved heterogeneity across cantons, we
ﬁnd that the mandatory budget referendum reduces state expenditures by 3.4 percent. If the
signature requirement were decreased by one standard deviation, it would result in 2.4 percent
less spending. Overall, our ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are much smaller than those reported in
the literature identiﬁed from cross-sectional variation. In sharp contrast to previous studies
(Matsusaka, 1995; Feld et al., 2008), we also show that a mandatory budget referendum at
the state level is neither associated with less spending at the local level nor more decentralized
public expenditures.
We provide evidence that the decision to adopt or abolish the budget referendum is sys-
tematically related to expenditures several years prior to the institutional change. To eliminate
the bias from reverse causality and other omitted variables, we use the diﬃculty to launch an
initiative for amending the constitution as an instrument. The results demonstrate that the
adoption of a mandatory budget referendum decreases canton spending by 13-19 percent but
have yet again no eﬀect on local spending. In addition, a one standard deviation lower signature
requirement for the initiative decreases canton spending between 6 and 9 percent, but has no
eﬀect on local government.
The results in this paper highlight the importance of accounting for unobserved diﬀerences
and endogeneity when evaluating the eﬀects of political institutions. They also provide strong
support for the view that budget referendums is a highly eﬀective tool to reduce government
spending both at the state and at the local level. Increasing the barriers for the voter initiative
29also has important eﬀects on canton spending, though not across levels of government.
Finally, we would like to point out that our results do not allow us to conclude that direct
democratic participation is welfare-improving. To do so, we would need to compare the desired
spending levels of the median voter with the costs of direct democratic participation to vot-
ers. While such an analysis is feasible, we leave an exploration of the welfare eﬀects of direct
democratic participation for future research.
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A Data Appendix
This appendix describes the data sources and construction of variables. Our main outcome
variables are canton expenditures, revenues, local expenditures and federal subsidies. All ex-
penditure and revenue categories are expressed per capita and deﬂated to 2000 Swiss Francs
using the annual consumer price index reported in Schuppli and Studer (2004). Canton expen-
ditures and revenues are taken from the annual publication ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’
for the years 1890 to 1950 and from ‘¨ Oﬀentliche Finanzen der Schweiz’ for 1950 to 2000. Govern-
ment expenditures and revenues are interpolated for two years with missing observations (1967
and 1968). Local expenditures are taken from ‘Historical Statistics of Switzerland’ and available
for 1863, 1900, 1910, 1938 and annually since 1950. Data are missing in Nidwalden, Uri and
Schaﬀhouse for 1863, 1900 and 1910 as well as in Obwalden, Solothurn, Appenzell-Innerrhode
and Appenzell-Outerrhode in 1900 and 1910. Data for all cantons are missing in 1967 and 1968.
Federal subsidies are revenues for cantons comprised of subsidies by the federal state for roads,
education, welfare, agriculture and other areas. They are obtained from ‘Historical Statistics of
Switzerland’ prior to 1955 and from ‘¨ Oﬀentliche Finanzen der Schweiz’ thereafter. The data are
available for 1893, annually between 1915 and 1926, 1928, 1930, 1931, 1933, 1935-1937, 1940,
331942, 1943, 1945, 1946, 1949 and annually since 1953, but missing between 1968 and 1977. All
missing years were again obtained by linear interpolation.
Our main institutional variable is whether a canton has a mandatory budget referendum in
place and the signature requirement for the voter initiative. We gathered this information by go-
ing though each canton’s past and current constitutions (available at http://www.verfassungen.de/ch)
as well as all relevant state laws. We used several published sources to validate and cross-check
our coding of the institutional variables (K¨ olz, 2004; Monnier, 1996; Ritzmann-Blickernstorfer,
1996; Trechsel and Serd¨ ult, 1999; Vatter, 2002). If in doubt, we contacted the respective can-
tonal Public Record Oﬃces (Staatsarchive) to clarify any inconsistencies between the published
sources.
Our measure is a binary indicator equal to one if the canton had a mandatory budget
referendum in place in that year. The indicator is zero if the budget referendum was optional
or the canton does not have one at all. All cantons allow for the voter initiative at the canton
level. Most cantons adopted the voter initiative well before the beginning of our sample period
in 1890. Three cantons adopted the voter initiative shortly thereafter: Geneva in 1891, Ticino
in 1892 and Berne in 1893. The remaining three cantons adopted it in 1906 (Lucerne), 1907
(Valais) and 1921 (Fribourg) respectively. The voter initiative is measured as the number of
signatures for launching an initiative measured in percentage of the eligible population.
As additional control, we also look at the eﬀect of the mandatory law referendum, which
requires all canton laws to be approved by the electorate. The variable for the law referendum is
a binary indicator if a canton has a mandatory law referendum in place and zero otherwise. In-
formation on voter support for more spending is collected from the online database of all federal
votes held between 1890 and today (http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab 2 2 4 1.html).
Our preference measure is constructed as the percentage of votes in each canton in favor
of propositions that would increase spending if approved. To identify the relevant ﬁscal policy
votes, we used the documents produced by the federal government, which contain the arguments
for and against a proposition and, most importantly, its estimated ﬁnancial consequences, i.e.
whether and by how much expenditures or taxes would increase if the proposition was approved.
These are available online at http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS/showHome.do. Our second
preference measure is calculated from the number of seats held by left-wing parties divided
by the number of seats in the canton parliament. Both are compiled from Hoﬀerbert (1967),
the ’Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’, information from old constitutions and information
provided by each canton’s Public Record Oﬃce. Left-wing party seats are missing for two can-
tons (Appenzell-Innerrhode and Appenzell-Outerrhode). No party seat information is available
prior to 1943 for Nidwalden and prior to 1966 for Obwalden. In many cantons, there were no
deﬁned party aﬃliations in the late 19th and early 20th century. For seven cantons (Basle City,
Geneva, Neuchatel, Lucerne, Solothurn, Schwyz and Zug), we have party aﬃliation over the
whole period; for seven more (Aargau, Saint Gallen, Zurich, Basle County, Fribourg, Thurgau
34and Grisons) we have information since the 1910s. Information in four cantons (Berne, Glarus,
Ticino and Valais) is available since the 1920s and for the remaining three since the early 1930s.
Most of our control variables are taken from the decennial Census as reported in ‘Historical
Statistics of Switzerland’, Hoﬀerbert (1976) and ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’; the data
are available for 1888, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1941, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The
population in each canton is from ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’ and available annually
since 1888. Population density is measured as the log of a canton’s population. The variable
urban measures the percentage of the population that lives in cities above 10,000 inhabitants.
The data is taken from ‘Historical Statistics of Switzerland’ and ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der
Schweiz’ and available for 1890, 1894, 1898, 1903, for each decade between 1910 and 1960 as
well as 1962, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1990 and 2000. The information on the population in
diﬀerent age groups (below 20, between 20 and 64 and above 65), the number of foreigners and
religious aﬃliation is from the decennial Census. All three variables are expressed as percentage
of the total population. Religious aﬃliation is calculated as the share of the population that is
Protestant as opposed to Catholics and other religions. Finally, we also constructed a binary
indicator whether the dominant language spoken in a canton is Italian or French.
We collected several labor market indicators to control for diﬀerences in economic activity
across cantons. The total number employed and employment in the ﬁrst (agriculture) and
second (manufacturing) sector are from the decennial Census. The labor force participation rate
is then calculated by dividing the number of people employed by the canton’s total population.
The distribution across sectors is calculated as percentage of total employment. We use three
additional variables to control for income diﬀerences across cantons. The number of doctors
is calculated per 1,000 inhabitants. The data is from ‘Historical Statistics of Switzerland’,
Hoﬀerbert (1976) and ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’ and available for 1890, 1895, 1900,
1910, 1917, 1920, 1926, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975. 1980.
1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. Infant mortality denotes the number of children that died before
reaching age one and is expressed per 100,000 births. The data for births and infant mortality
is available annually since 1890 and taken from ‘Historical Statistics of Switzerland’. Car
ownership is calculated as number of cars per population and is from ‘Historical Statistics of
Switzerland’ and ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz’. It is zero before the ﬁrst cars emerged
in 1910 and positive thereafter. Data on cars owned is available for 1910, 1914, 1917, 1923,
1929, 1934, 1939, 1945, 1947, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986 and
annually since 1990. We used linear interpolation for missing years between two data points.
We did not extrapolate missing data back to our starting year in 1890.
35Mandatory Changes in  Signature  Changes in 
Budget Mandatory Requirement  Signature  Requirement
Referendum Budget Referendum Voter Initiative of Voter Initiative
Aargau (AG) No Abolish (1982) 3,000 Decrease (1982)
Appenzell Outerrhode (AR) Yes No 300 Increase (1995)
Appenzell Innerrhode (AI) Yes Adopt (1979) 1 No
Basle County (BL) No Adopt (1892), Abolish (1945) 1,500 No
Basle City (BS) No No 4,000 Increase (1950; 1975)
Berne (BE) No Adopt (1893), Abolish (1995) 15,000 Increase (1995)
Fribourg (FR) Yes Adopt (1972) 6,000 No
Geneva (GE) No Adopt (1927), Abolish (1931) 10,000 Increase (1936, 1950)
Glarus (GL) Yes No 1 No
Grisons (GR) Yes No 3,000 Decrease (1893)
Lucerne (LU) Yes Adopt (1969) 4,000 No
Neuchatel (NE) Yes Adopt (1949), Abolish (2000) 6,000 Increase (1959)
Nidwalden (NW) Yes Adopt (1913) 250 Increase (1996)
Obwalden (OW) No Adopt (1902), Abolish (1998) 500 Increase (1998)
Schaffhouse (SH) Yes Adopt (1895) 1,000 No
Schwyz (SZ) Yes No 2,000 No
Solothum (SO) Yes No 3,000 Increase (1977)
St. Gallen (SG) Yes Adopt (1929) 4,000 No
Ticino (TI) No No 7,000 Increase (1970)
Thurgau (TG) Yes No 4,000 Increase (1990)
Uri (UR) Yes No 600 Increase (1929, 1955, 1997)
Vaud (VD) No Abolish (1948), Adopt (1998) 12,000 Increase (1961)
Valais (VS) No Abolish (1994) 4,000 Increase (1973), Decrease (1994)
Zurich (ZH) No Abolish (1999) 10,000 Increase (1979)
Zug (ZG) No No 2,000 Decrease (1894), Increase (1991)
Table 1: Direct Democratic Instruments in Swiss Cantons in 2000
Notes: The table summarizes the key features of direct democracy in Swiss cantons. Column (1) reports whether cantons have a mandatory budget
referendum in 2000, while column (2) shows whether and when cantons changed their provisions for the budget referendum between 1890 and 2000.
The budget referendum in Fribourg after 1972 and Valais between 1920 and 1994 applies to extraordinary expenditures only which we code as a
mandatory referendum. Obwalden only had a referendum for spending on roads prior to 1902 which we do code as no mandatory budget referendum.
Column (3) shows the absolute number of signatures required to launch a voter initiative, which is available in all cantons in 2000. Finally, column (4)
shows the changes in the absolute number of signatures required over our sample period. In the empirical analysis, our measure of the voter initiative
is the signature requirement in percentage of the eligible populationT Statistic
Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Difference
Fiscal Policy
Expenditures per capita (log) 7.15 1.24 7.18 1.31 0.5
Revenues per capita (log) 7.13 1.25 7.15 1.31 0.4
Local expenditures in canton (log) 7.07 1.19 6.63 1.13 -9.5
Degree of Centralization  53.72 12.45 61.38 17.15 -2.9
Political Institutions
Signature requirement initiative (%) 2.39 3.17 4.20 6.44 9.9
Mandatory law referendum 0.84 0.37 0.26 0.44 -40.4
Size of Parliament 115.67 55.74 111.42 43.19 -2.0
Size of Executive 6.44 1.44 6.75 1.32 5.7
Proportional Representation 0.53 0.50 0.76 0.43 11.7
Women Suffrage Adopted? 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 -1.5
Control Variables
Language: non-German 0.14 0.35 0.43 0.49 17.9
Age 0 to 19 (%) 34.22 6.11 32.99 7.83 -4.6
Age 20 to 39 (%) 29.66 2.25 30.58 2.94 9.3
A g e4 0t o6 4( % ) 26.50 3.07 27.33 4.04 6.1
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Institutional Regime
Mandatory Referendum No Mandatory Referendum
Age 40 to 64 (%) 26.50 3.07 27.33 4.04 6.1
Age 65 and Above (%)  9.63 3.47 9.10 3.70 -3.7
Log population 11.61 1.13 11.69 1.06 1.7
Urban population (%) 19.01 19.07 37.77 31.02 19.7
Federal subsidies (log) 5.43 1.21 5.16 1.07 -5.7
Employment in primary sector (%) 21.04 12.91 18.89 15.44 -3.9
Employment in secondary sector (%) 44.66 11.96 41.54 9.81 -7.0
Labor force participation 39.92 7.15 42.13 8.36 6.9
Doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 0.81 0.35 1.05 0.64 12.6
Cars owned (%) 12.58 16.50 11.70 17.01 -1.3
Infant mortality rate  59.77 106.05 61.20 89.29 0.4
Linguistic Heterogeneity 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.16 1.9
Religious Heterogeneity 0.34 0.20 0.34 0.20 -0.3
Notes: The table reports summary statistics over the whole sample period (1890-2000) separately for cantons with mandatory budget
referendum and those without. The last column reports the T-value for differences in means between the two groups of cantons. The
degree of centralization is the percentage of local and canton expenditures that are undertaken at the canton level. The signature
requirement for the voter initiative is calculated as percentage of the population over 20. Linguistic and religious heterogeneity is
calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index for three language and religious groups. Infant mortality is calculated as number of
children dying before age 1 among 100,000 births.     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget Referendum  -0.267 -0.093 -0.034 -0.259 -0.086 -0.018
(0.017)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)** (0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)
Signature Requirement Initiative -0.01 0.004 0.005 -0.011 0.005 0.006
(0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Log Population  -0.122 0.122 -0.128 0.135
(0.008)*** (0.050)** (0.008)*** (0.054)**
% Age 20 to 39 Years  0.056 -0.005 0.048 -0.016
(0.005)*** (0.004) (0.005)*** (0.004)***
% Age 40 to 64 Years  0.039 0.002 0.035 -0.002
(0.004)*** (0.003) (0.004)*** (0.004)
% Above Age 65  0.006 -0.04 0.008 -0.033
(0.005) (0.006)*** (0.005) (0.007)***
% Urban Population 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.138 0.146 0.117 0.128
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)***
% Employed Agriculture -0.014 0.004 -0.018 -0.001
(0.002)*** (0.002)* (0.002)*** (0.002)
% Employed Industry  -0.006 0.016 -0.007 0.015
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
Labor Force Participation (%) -0.01 -0.018 -0.011 -0.018
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Doctors (per 1,000 inhabitants) 0.089 -0.164 0.057 -0.215
(0.029)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)* (0.029)***
Car Ownership per capita (%) 0.023 0.013 0.023 0.012
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Infant Mortality Rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Structure of Canton  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2524 2524 2524 2524 2524 2524
R-squared 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.95 0.98
Joint Significance Canton FE 110.4 98.1
(p value) <0.001 <0.001
Table 3: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Fixed Effects 
Canton Expenditures Canton Revenues
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is log annual canton per capita expenditures and log annual canton per capita revenues in
columns (4)-(6). The first specification (columns (1) and (4)) include only whether a canton has a mandatory budget referendum in place and the
signature requirement for the voter initiative as well as year dummies. The second specification adds log population, the percentage of the
population in different age groups (20-39, 40-64, 65 and over with age 0-19 as the omitted category), the percentage of the population living in
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the percentage of workers employed in agriculture and industry, the log per capita federal subsidies to a
canton, labor force participation rate, infant mortality rate, the per capita ownership of cars and the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. The last two rows in columns (3) and (6) report the F-
statistic and p-value for the joint significance of the canton fixed effects.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget Referendum  0.219 0.203 -0.024 -8.96 -6.302 -0.372
(0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.024) (0.578)*** (0.552)*** (0.517)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.002 0.019 0.017 -0.274 -0.366 -0.333
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.067)*** (0.074)*** (0.055)***
Log Population  0.139 -0.911 -4.882 14.947
(0.014)*** (0.090)*** (0.330)*** (1.912)***
% Urban Population -0.003 0.006 0.032 -0.069
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.018)* (0.026)***
Federal Subsidies (log) 0.016 -0.062 3.389 4.388
(0.021) (0.018)*** (0.482)*** (0.383)***
% Employed Agriculture -0.023 -0.019 0.017 0.289
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.069) (0.072)***
% Employed Industry  -0.002 0.011 -0.287 -0.152
(0.002) (0.004)*** (0.055)*** (0.076)**
Labor Force Participation (%) 0.009 -0.001 -0.296 -0.250
(0.002)*** (0.002) (0.054)*** (0.050)***
Doctors (per 1,000 inhabitants) -0.531 -0.416 5.325 -2.531
(0.051)*** (0.047)*** (1.173)*** (0.984)**
Car Ownership per capita (%) 0.048 0.043 -1.057 -0.962
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.102)*** (0.085)***
Infant Mortality Rate -0.0003 -0.0002 0.042 0.030
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Structure of Canton  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410 2410
R-squared 0.77 0.84 0.93 0.16 0.44 0.79
Joint Significance Canton FE 117.1 152.8
(p value) <0.001 <0.001
Notes: The dependent variable in the first three columns is log per capita expenditures of local communities in each canton; in columns
(4) to (6), it is the percentage of per capita expenditures at the canton level calculated as canton spending/(canton+local spending). For
three cantons (Uri, Schaffhouse and Nidwalden), local expenditures were only available since 1938. See the notes to Table 3 for an
explanation of the independent variables included in the estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. The last two rows in columns (3) and (6) report the F-statistic and p-value for the joint significance of the canton
fixed effects.
Table 4: Direct Democracy and Decentralization: Fixed Effects
Local Expenditures Centralization MeasureVoter  Voter  Population Change in  Mandatory  Size of  Account for
Preferences Preferences Heterogeneity Voting  Law  Parliament, Serial
(ballot support) (left parties) Rights Referendum Executive Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Y: Canton Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.045 -0.042 -0.04 -0.034 -0.049 -0.025 -0.017
(0.015)** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)*** (0.014)* (0.009)*
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*
Voter Preferences 0.003 0
(0.001)** (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1349 2399 2524 2524 2524 2524 1514
R Squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Y: Local Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.043 -0.051 -0.024 -0.024 -0.036 0.011 -0.016
(0.031) (0.017)** (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.016)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.009
(0.013) (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Voter Preferences 0.004 0.377
(0.002)* (0.116)**
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1322 1904 2410 2410 2410 2410 1438
R Squared  0.94 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94
Notes: The dependent variable in the top panel is the log of canton expenditures and the log of local expenditures in the bottom panel. Column (1) and (2) adds our preference
measures (voter support for more government and the share of left-wing parties in canton parliaments respectively) to the baseline. Column (3) includes two measures of religious
and linguistic heterogeneity. Column (4) controls for the introduction of female suffrage and proportional represention. Column (5) also controls for the mandatory law referendum,
while column (6) adds the size of executive and the size of parliament. Finally, column (7) implements the before-after estimator proposed by Betrand et al. (2004) to deal with serial
correlation in the case of a small number of states. All specifications include year and canton fixed effects and the same controls as in column (3) in Table 3. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and
*** p< 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 5: Robustness ChecksBudget Voter  OLS  IV IV plus OLS  IV IV plus
Referendum Initiative Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mandatory Budget Referendum  -0.049 -0.19 -0.127 0.025 -0.128 -0.049
(0.011)*** (0.041)*** (0.029)*** (0.016) (0.055)** (0.037)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.009 0.019 0.013 0.02 -0.006 -0.014
(0.002)*** (0.008)** (0.007)** (0.003)*** (0.010) (0.011)
Signature Requirement Constitutional Initiative -0.094 0.759
(0.025)*** (0.113)***
Signature Requirement Squared 0.008 -0.01
(0.002)*** '(0.013)
Budget Referendum 20 Years Earlier 0.365 0.425
(0.034)*** (0.128)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2274 2274 2274 2274 2274 2190 2190 2190
R Squared 0.76 0.69 0.98 0.96
Shea's Partial R Squared of First-Stage 0.11 0.09
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments  49.88 125.6
Sargan statistic  0.091 161.1 9.68 146.4
(p value) 0.76 0.85 0.03 0.97
Second Stage (Canton Expenditures)
Table 6: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Policy: Instrumental Variables 
Notes: The table reports instrumental variable results. The instruments for the budget referendum and signature requirement of the voter initiative are the signature requirement to launch a constitutional
initiative (linear and quadratic term). Columns (1) and (2) show the first stage where the dependent variable is whether a canton has a mandatory budget referendum (column (1)) or the signature
requirement for the voter initiative (column (2)). The dependent variable in columns (3) to (5) are log canton expenditures and log local expenditures in columns (6) to (8). Columns (3) and (6) show the least
squares regression results for the sample with valid observations of the instruments. Columns (4) and (7) show the second-stage instrumental variable estimates. Columns (5) and (8) show the second-
stage instrumental variables results where the effects of the constitutional initiative varies by year. All specifications include year and canton fixed effects, the same controls as in previous tables and the
following additional controls: whether the canton has a mandatory law referendum, the number of seats in the canton parliament, the size of the executive, whether a canton had women's suffrage adopted
and whether the canton parliament is elected according to proportional rule. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. 
Second Stage (Local Expenditures) First Stage Results Figure 1: Map of Swiss Cantons
Legend: 
White: No Mandatory Budget Referendum, High Signature Requirement Initiative
Yellow: No Mandatory Budget Referendum, Low Signature Requirement Initiative
Orange: Mandatory Budget Referendum, High Signature Requirement Initiative
Red: Mandatory Budget Referendum, Low Signature Requirement Initiative Overall Total  Between  Within 
Mean Std.  Dev Variation Variation
Fiscal Policy
Expenditures per capita (log) 7.16 1.26 0.35 1.22
Revenues per capita (log) 7.14 1.27 0.35 1.22
Local expenditures in canton (log) 6.91 1.19 0.46 1.10
Degree of Centralization  56.48 14.78 11.74 9.34
Political Institutions
Mandatory budget referendum 0.65 0.48 0.38 0.30
Signature requirement initiative (%) 2.36 1.75 1.61 0.84
Mandatory law referendum 0.61 0.49 0.47 0.16
Cantonal ballots per year* 5.63 4.08 3.01 2.82
Size of Parliament 114.22 51.82 51.89 10.26
Size of Executive 6.55 1.41 1.41 0.28
Proportional Representation 0.62 0.49 0.34 0.35
Women Suffrage Adopted? 0.27 0.45 0.06 0.44
Control Variables
Age 0 to 19 (%) 33.79 6.79 3.70 5.74
Age 20 to 39 (%) 29.98 2.55 1.88 1.76
Age 40 to 64 (%) 26.79 3.47 1.75 3.01
Age 65 and Above (%)  9.44 3.56 1.15 3.38
Log population 11.64 1.10 1.09 0.27
Urban population (%) 25.62 25.58 24.21 9.56
Federal subsidies (log) 5.43 1.21 5.16 1.07
Labor force participation 40.67 7.66 4.14 6.49
Employment in primary sector (%) 20.28 13.89 9.52 10.29
Employment in secondary sector (%) 43.56 11.34 9.12 6.98
Doctors per 1,000 inhabitants 0.89 0.48 0.34 0.35
Cars owned (%) 12.27 16.69 1.60 16.61
Infant mortality rate  60.28 100.45 57.81 82.95
Linguistic Heterogeneity 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.14
Religious Heterogeneity 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.13
Table A1: Within and Between Canton Variation of Main Variables 
Notes: The table reports the overall mean (column (1)) and standard deviation (column (2)) for the variables used in
the empirical analysis. Column (3) and column (4) report the variation between and within cantons respectively over
our sample period. Number Title of Proposition Year  % Yes Outcome Number Title of Proposition Year  % Yes Outcome
35 Disability Insurance for Civil Servants and Public Employees 1891 21% No 302 Removal of Canton Share in Stamp Duties 1980 67% Yes
43 Share Customs Revenues with Cantons [lessexp]  1894 29% No 303 Redistribution of Revenues from Alcohol Tax 1980 71% Yes
46 Revision of Military Provisions 1895 42% No 305 For a new Immigration Policy 1981 16% No
52 Trade with Food (Revise Article 24, Constitution) 1897 65% Yes 308 Improving Federal Finances 1981 69% Yes
53 Nationalisation of Swiss Railways 1898 68% Yes 312 Regulation of Gas Taxes 1983 53% Yes
56 Health and Accident Insurance 1900 30% No 313 Energy Article 1983 49% No
60 Revision of Tariffs on Foreign Products [lessexp] 1903 60% Yes 316 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1984 59% Yes
66 Change in Organization of Swiss Military 1907 55% Yes 317 User Fee for Highways (Nationalstrassen) 1984 53% Yes
71 Health and Accident Insurance 1912 54% Yes 323 Protection Motherhood 1984 15% No
99 Initiative for Old Age, Widow and Disability Insurance  1925 42% Yes 324 Regulation of Radio and Television 1984 69% Yes
101 Federal Law on Old Age, Widow and Disability Insurance 1925 65% Yes 331 Removal of Canton Share in Stamp Duties 1985 67% Yes
102 Constitutional Amendment Regarding Corn Supply  1926 50% No 332 Redistribution of Revenues from Alcohol Tax 1985 72% Yes
115 Old Age and Widow Insurance 1931 40% No 335 Subsidies for Small and Medium-Sized Firms 1985 43% No
117 Temporary Decrease in Salaries of Public Employees 1933 45% No 339 Culture Initiative 1986 43% No
119 Change in Organization of Military Training 1935 54% Yes 340 Secure Vocational Training and Retraining 1986 17% No
121 Fight Economic Crisis 1935 43% No 341 Domestic Sugar Industry Regulation 1986 38% No
131 Loans for Military Investment and Reduce Unemployment 1939 69% Yes 342 Protection of Renters 1986 63% Yes
132 Change in Insurance for Civil Servants 1939 44% No 348 Railway 2000 1987 56% Yes
139 Protecting the Family 1945 76% Yes 349 Protection of the Moor 1987 57% Yes
141 Establishing a Right of Holding a Job 1946 19% No 350 Reform Health Insurance 1987 28% No
142 Economic Reforms and Right of Holding a Job 1947 31% No 351 Constitutional Basis for Transport Policy 1988 46% No
143 Revision of Economic Laws in the Constitution 1947 53% Yes 352 Decrease Retirement Age  1988 35% No
145 Regulation of Swiss Sugar Industry  1948 36% No 363 Regulation of Wine Industry 1990 46% No
150 Subsidies for Housing Construction  1950 46% No 367 Energy Supply Article 1990 71% Yes
157 Contribution to Costs of National Defense 1951 33% No 368 Change in Traffic Law  1990 52% Yes
159 Subsidies for Agriculture 1952 64% Yes 370 Promoting Public Transport 1991 37% No
168 Changes in Federal Finances 1953 42% No 371 Reform of Federal Finances 1991 46% No
171 Subsidies for Swiss War Veterans Living Abroad 1954 44% No 373 Financing of Health Insurance 1992 39% No
177 Subsidy for Canton Grisons 1956 43% No 377 Protection of Waters 1992 66% Yes
178 Changes in Order for Wheat Production 1956 39% No 381 Saving the Waters 1992 37% No
187 Improving the Road Infrastructure 1958 85% Yes 382 Building Railway through the Alps 1992 63% Yes
194 Subsidies for Milk Producers  1960 56% Yes 386 Raise Salary of Parliamentary Members 1992 27% No
196 Gas Tax for Financing Highway Construction (Nationalstrassen 1961 47% No 387 Improve Infrastructure for Parliamentary Members 1992 30% No
201 Salaries of Representatives and Government Members 1962 32% No 389 Increase in Gas Tax 1993 55% Yes
205 Scholarships and Other Training Subsidies 1963 79% Yes 398 Unemployment Insurance 1993 70% Yes
207 Vocational Training 1964 67% Yes 399 Federal Finances  1993 67% Yes
219 Subsidies for Domestic Sugar Industry 1970 54% Yes 400 Improving Federal Finances 1993 58% Yes
222 Housing Guarantee and Protection of Families 1970 49% No 401 Maintenance of Social Security 1993 63% Yes
223 Changes in Federal Finances 1970 55% No 405 Continuing Highway Fee 1994 69% Yes
227 Subsidies for Apartment Construction 1972 30% No 406 Continuing Heavy Traffic Fee 1994 72% Yes
232 Changes in Old Age and Disability Insurance 1972 16% No 407 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1994 67% Yes
235 Subsidies for Scientific Research  1973 65% Yes 410 Promote Culture 1994 50% No
240 Restriction on Deductions of Income Tax  1973 68% Yes 415 Change in Health Insurance 1994 51% Yes
245 Socially Acceptable Health Insurance 1974 27% No 416 For a new Health Insurance 1994 23% No
248 Financing Highway Construction (Nationalstrassen) 1975 54% Yes 423 Securing Invalidity/Age Insurance 1995 27% No
249 Changes in General Customs Tariffs 1975 48% No 430 For an Environmentally Oriented Agriculture 1996 77% Yes
258 Loan to International Development Agency 1976 44% No 431 Re-Organisation Administration 1996 39% No
268 Changes in Sales Tax and Direct Federal Tax 1977 41% No 442 Introduction of User Fee for Heavy Traffic 1998 57% Yes
281 Decrease Retirement Age  1978 21% No 444 Reform of Age Insurance 1998 41% No
286 Subsidies for Universities/Technical Colleges 1978 43% No 445 Infrastructure for Public Transportation 1998 63% Yes
289 Milk Production 1978 69% Yes 458 Law on Insurance of Motherhood 1999 38% No
291 Federal Responsibility for Security  1978 44% No 465 Subsidies for Solar Energy (Solarrappen) 2000 31% No
294 Subsidize Hiking Trails 1979 76% Yes 469 For a flexible Age Insurance 2000 39% No
297 Changes in Sales Tax and Direct Federal Tax 1979 35% No 470 For a flexible Retirement Age 2000 46% No
Notes: The table lists the federal propositions, which would have increased the size of government through higher spending, taxes or subsidies. The financial consequences of a proposition were assessed using the official documents by the federal government
(available at http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS/showHome.do), which are distributed to each citizen before the vote. The first column shows the official number of the vote. Column (4) contains the percentage of voters supporting the proposition, while the last column
reports the final outcome. For vote #223, the majority of the electorate voted in favor but the Council of States rejected it. 
Table A2: Federal Propositions inducing More Federal Spending, 1891-2000Absolute # Discrete  Interaction Effect by
of Signatures Signature  Budget Ref. Subperiods
Law Initiative Requirement Law Initiative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y: Canton Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.034 -0.036 0.012 -0.048
(0.014)** (0.014)*** (0.016) (0.017)***
Signature Requirement Initiative (%) 0.008 0.022
(0.002)*** (0.005)***
# Signatures Required Initiative/100 0.001
(0.0004)***
Signature Requirement 1% or less -0.324
(0.043)***
Signature Requirement 1 to 3% -0.175
(0.039)***
Signature Requirement More than 3% -0.099
(0.035)***
Interaction Effect BRef*Initiative -0.016
(0.003)***
Budget Referendum before 1945 0.014
(0.019)
Signature Requirement before 1945 -0.017
(0.005)***
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2524 2524 2524 2524
R Squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Y: Local Expenditures
Budget Referendum -0.058 -0.026 0.183 -0.026
(0.027)** (0.024) (0.028)*** (0.029)
Signature Requirement Initiative 0.030 0.011
(0.003)*** (0.010)
# Signatures Required Initiative/100 0.0003
(0.0007)
Signature Requirement 1 % or less -0.363
(0.079)***
Signature Requirement 1 to 3 % -0.412
(0.071)***
Signature Requirement More than 3 % -0.445
(0.064)***
Interaction Effect BRef*Initiative -0.069
(0.005)***
Budget Referendum before 1945 0.008
(0.035)
Signature Requirement before 1945 0.006
(0.009)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2490 2410 2410 2410
R Squared  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Table A3: Additional Results 
Notes: The table reports results for log canton expenditures (top panel) and log local expenditures (bottom panel). Column
(1) uses a discrete measure for the signature requirement with the omitted group of no voter initiative. Column (2) uses the
absolute number of signatures for the law initiative (divided by 1000). Column (3) includes the interaction between mandatory
budget referendum and the signature requirement for the law initiative. Column (4) allows the coefficients for the direct
democratic institutions to vary before and after the end of World War II in 1945. * p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses.    4-6 Years 1-3 Years 0-4 Years  More than 5 Years p value p value
log Canton Expenditures before Change before Change after Change after Change 4-6 vs 1-3 yrs. 0-4 vs 5+ yrs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
Adopt Budget Referendum -0.064 0.081 0.049 0.005 0.00 0.01
(0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.025)* (0.017)
Abolish Budget Referendum 0.001 0.04 0.076 0.167 0.20 0.01
(0.015) (0.020)** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
Change Signatures Law Initiative 0.03 -0.008 0.035 0.271 0.25 0.00
(0.016)* (0.020) (0.016)** (0.030)***
Notes: The table reports estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for dummy variables denoting time periods relative to changes in direct democratic institutions.
The dependent variable is the log of canton expenditures. All specifications control for state and year fixed effects and the same canton characteristics as in column (3) of
Table 3. The p-values correspond to the F-statistics are shown in the last three columns)*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table A4: Dynamic Effects of Direct Democracy on Government SpendingProbit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Expenditures T-2 0.019 0.034 -0.001 -0.007 -0.04 -0.023
(0.045) (0.013)** (0.004) (0.012) (0.050) (0.028)
Log Expenditures T-3 -0.014 -0.016 0.001 0.006 -0.023 0.012
(0.034) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.057) (0.031)
Log Expenditures T-5 -0.006 -0.018 0 0 0.001 0.021
(0.015) (0.010)* (0.000) (0.010) (0.041) (0.022)
Observations 225 2524 200 2524 1025 2524
R Squared 0.06 0.05 0.19
Log-likelihood -23.68 -19.7 -135.59
∆ Log Expenditures T-2 0 -0.007 0 -0.004 0.008 0
(0.004) (0.013) (0.000) (0.012) (0.055) (0.027)
∆ Log Expenditures T-3 0.017 0.029 0 -0.007 0.007 -0.024
(0.043) (0.013)** (0.000) (0.012) (0.053) (0.027)
Observations 225 2524 200 2524 1025 2524
R Squared 0.06 0.05 0.19
Log-likelihood -25.01 -19.83 -142.66
Table A5: Feedback Effects between Spending and Changes in Direct Democracy
Notes: The table reports estimates (marginal effects in the case of probit estimates in odd columns) where the dependent variables are
whether a mandatory budget referendum was adopted (columns (1) and (2)) or abolished (columns (3) and (4)) and changes in the signature
requirement for the voter initiative (columns (5) and (6)). The top panel includes log epxenditures two, three and five years prior to the change
in the institution. The bottom panel includes growth rates in expenditures two and three years prior to the institutional reform. All specifications
include canton and year effects as well as the same canton characteristics as in previous tables. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. 
Adopt Mandatory Abolish Mandatory Change Signatures
Budget Referendum  Budget Referendum  Law Initiative